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ABSTRACT
When firms from developed markets acquire firms in emerging markets, market-capitalization-
weighted  monthly  joint  returns  show  a  statistically  significant  increase  of  1.8%.  Panel  data
estimations suggest that the value gains from cross-border M&A transactions stem from the transfer
of majority control from emerging-market targets to developed market acquirers – joint returns range
from 5.8% to 7.8% when majority control is acquired. Announcement returns for acquirer and target
firms estimate the distribution of gains and show a statistically significant increase of 2.4% and
6.9%, respectively. The evidence suggests that the stock market anticipates significant value creation
from cross-border transactions that involve emerging-market targets leading to substantial gains for
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1.  Introduction 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in emerging markets surged during 
the 1990s.  From 1991 through 2000 cross-border M&As accounted for 61% of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and 48% in East Asia, up from 10% and 4% in 
the 1980s (Figure 1).    
Before the surge in cross-border M&A, FDI in emerging markets consisted 
primarily of green-field investments.  Cross-border M&A and green-field investments are 
conceptually quite different.  By definition, green-field investments create value by 
bringing new investment in physical assets to the recipient country.  In contrast, cross-
border M&As involve the foreign purchase of existing assets, which may not necessarily 
increase productive capacity (Froot, 1991).   
Alternatively, cross-border M&A transactions may create value by allowing firms 
to vertically integrate lines of production across borders and through positive externalities 
such as transfers of technology and skills between firms (Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford, 2001).  M&A transactions will also create value if they provide acquirers with 
access to target markets or lower the cost of capital for target firms (Caves 1996).  
Do cross-border mergers and acquisitions create surplus value in emerging 
markets?  This paper uses the stock market to provide an answer.  When a cross-border 
M&A transaction takes place, there are two parties to consider—a developed-market 
acquirer and an emerging-market target.  On the date that a cross-border M&A 
transaction is announced, changes in acquirer- and target-firm stock prices reveal 
information about (i) the potential wealth creation from the transaction, and (ii) the 
distribution of the gains and losses from the transaction to the acquirer and target firms.       3
We use the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thompson’s International Mergers 
and Acquisitions database to identify merger and acquisition events in emerging markets 
over the period 1988-2003.  Stock price information is taken from Datastream and 
Bloomberg.  Changes in market-weighted joint returns for acquirers and targets serve as a 
summary statistic for value creation through cross-border M&A activity.  Changes in 
acquirer- and target-firm stock prices provide an estimate of the value gains or losses to 
their respective shareholders. 
At first blush, our results suggest that cross-border M&A transactions lead to a 
creation of surplus value.  Panel data estimations suggest that market-capitalization-
weighted joint returns for targets and acquirers show a statistically significant increase of 
1.8% when a cross-border M&A transaction is announced.  Joint-return increases are 
robust to the inclusion of controls for country, time, industrial diversification, method of 
payment effects, as well as acquirer- and target-firm characteristics such as size and 
liquidity.    
Moving beyond the basic issue of measuring the creation of surplus value, lies the 
more fundamental question of why firms would be worth more under foreign rather than 
domestic control (Kindleberger, 1969).  A key feature of the cross-border M&A 
transactions in our data is the acquisition of majority control by developed market 
acquirers.  For instance, 628 out 842 acquirers in the sample did not own any shares in 
the target before the cross-border M&A announcement, but moved to majority or full 
ownership following the announcement.  For 153 transactions where the acquirer had a 
minority interest in the target, 31 resulted in a transfer of majority control or full 
ownership following the transaction.  The pattern of shifting majority control is 
consistent with the evidence that when foreign ownership restrictions are removed in an   4
emerging market like Mexico, affiliates of US multinationals move to majority or full 
foreign ownership (Perez-Gonzalez, 2004).   
Acquiring majority control can be important particularly in situations where it is 
difficult to write or enforce complete contracts (Coase, 1937; Alchian, Crawford, and 
Klein, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1979).  Problems of ineffective 
monitoring and incomplete contracting are especially important in emerging markets 
(Antras, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and, 
Vishny 1998).  By acquiring majority control, developed-market acquirers in effect 
extend the boundaries of the firm across borders to include the emerging-market targets.  
In a setting with weak property rights, acquiring majority control may create the 
necessary incentives to transfer technology and capital to the target firms.   
Panel data estimations in this paper verify that the stock market anticipates 
significant gains when the acquirer gains majority control of the target.  Joint returns in 
the announcement window are significantly higher when a developed market acquirer 
gains majority control of an emerging market target ranging from 5.8%-7.8% in 
alternative specifications.  The result is consistent with studies that examine the effects of 
FDI and conclude that FDI results in improvements in productivity (Aitkin and Harrison, 
1999) and that the productivity gains resulting from FDI are concentrated in plants where 
multinational firms acquire majority or full ownership (Perez-Gonzalez, 2004). 
Next, we turn to the distribution of gains.  Following the Williams Act (1968), 
studies based on US data suggest that a lion’s share of the combined gains from domestic 
M&A transactions accrue to target-firm shareholders leaving little or no gains for the 
shareholders of the acquiring firms (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Brickley, Jarrell, and 
Netter, 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001).  The estimations in this paper show   5
that developed-market acquirers experience a statistically significant gain of 2.4% when 
they announce M&A transactions in emerging markets.  On average, monthly returns for 
target firms are also positive when a cross-border M&A transaction is announced—and 
equal 6.8% on a market-adjusted basis.  Put another way, the announcement returns 
translate to a median market capitalization gain of $117 million and $3.12 million for the 
shareholders of acquirer and target firms, respectively.  Distinct from domestic 
transactions, the distribution of gains appears to shift in favor of developed-market 
acquirers in emerging-market transactions.   
Would the acquirers in our sample gain from the acquisition of control in M&A 
transactions regardless of the geographic location of the target? Or, are the gains 
particular to the emerging-market context?  To test whether majority control matters 
outright or only in situations where institutions are poor, the announcement returns for 
developed-market acquirers are compared between developed- and emerging-market 
M&A transactions.  The estimates suggest that when an acquisition of a target located in 
the developed markets in our sample, such as, Canada, Europe, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and the United States is announced, acquiring majority control does not lead 
to an increase in acquirer returns.  In contrast, when majority control of an emerging-
market target is announced, acquirer returns show a statistically significant increase of 
5.8% to 12.9% in alternative specifications.    Moreover, the effect of acquiring control 
appears more important in R&D-intensive industries where the transfer of proprietary 
assets is an issue.  The transfer of majority control may create value by providing a 
mechanism through which acquirers are able to lend developed-market institutions to 
emerging-market targets (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003; Bris and Cabolis, 2004).     6
   It is important to caution that the value gains estimated in this paper pertain to 
specific acquirer-target pairs that engage in cross-border M&A transactions.  As a result, 
the evidence does not speak to the issue of the welfare implications of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions from a general equilibrium perspective.  In particular, the results 
do not provide evidence on the impact of a cross-border M&A transaction on the other 
firms in an emerging-market target’s industry.  The estimates of wealth creation from 
cross-border M&A activity cannot, therefore, be generalized to the rest of the emerging-
market economy.   
The focus of this paper is on the stock price reaction, an inherently ex-ante 
measure, to news of an acquisition as a summary statistic to capture the gains and losses 
from an acquisition.  It does not consider whether the synergies from the acquisition as 
measured by announcement returns are in fact realized.  Indeed, the empirical analysis 
does not look at the ex-post performance of the combined firm.  A drawback of ex-post 
performance measures is that these measures tend to be fraught with endogeneity 
problems and are sensitive to the choice of different sample periods as well as the 
benchmark that is used to measure risk (Barber, Lyon, and Tsai, 1999).  
In light of these issues, this paper turns to changes in stock prices to derive 
forward-looking estimates of changes in discounted expected future cash flows when a 
cross-border acquisition is announced.  Illusory or not, the stock market’s reaction tells us 
what the market thinks (Lang and Stulz, 1994).  Whether the stock market’s reaction is 
rational or not is a separate question.   
   7
2.  The Data 
The empirical analysis is based on data from SDC Thompson’s International 
Mergers and Acquisitions database.  The data include all public and private M&A 
transactions involving at least 5% ownership of the target company.  SDC collates 
information from over 200 English and foreign language news sources, SEC filings and 
the filings from its international counterparts, trade publications, newswire reports, and 
proprietary surveys of investment banks, law firms, and other advisory firms.   
The sample of emerging market targets covers nine Latin American and East 
Asian countries over the period 1988-2002.  The nine target countries are Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.   
Subsidiary firms of multinational companies domiciled in a developed market are not 
used in the estimations, because while they are identified as publicly traded firms in the 
SDC database, they are not necessarily listed on the stock exchanges in the target nations.      
For each transaction, the SDC database provides information about the date on 
which the transaction was announced and the date on which the transaction became 
effective.  The database also provides some characteristics of the target and acquiring 
firms such as name, nation, industry sector, and primary SIC classification.  Many of the 
transactions contain transaction-specific information such as the percent of shares 
acquired, the percent of shares owned before and after the transaction is completed, and 
the percent of shares sought by the acquiring firm.
2  The paper supplements this data with 
                                                 
2 SDC also provides some information about the nature of the transaction.  Cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions are transacted through a variety of means, from privately negotiated sales to open market 
tender offers.  In the emerging market sample, a significant number of acquisitions are transacted through a 
third party.  In these cases, the target share price is unaffected by possible bidding pressure, and instead, 
any change in price will reflect the markets view of the value of the new owner relative to the previous 
owner.  However, even with developed-market targets, this bidding pressure infrequently contributes to 
target price changes as the majority of transactions in the sample are completed without the acquirer 
directly tapping into the open market.    8
stock price information from Datastream, Bloomberg and the ISI Emerging Markets 
Database for the target and acquirer firms.  The announcement dates and firm names 
were cross-checked using Factiva to confirm the identity of the firms as well as double-
check the announcement dates provided by SDC.  Buy and hold returns are constructed 
using weekly data on stock prices.  All returns are denominated in the local currency and 
the US dollar.  For target firms, return data is dropped from sample if during the event 
window the target security did not change price for more than two consecutive weeks.   
The data description covers 1629 M&A transactions by publicly traded developed 
market acquirers that involve a publicly traded emerging-market target.  Of these 
transactions, stock price data was available for 379 emerging market firms.  The sample 
of emerging-market targets is supplemented with an additional 1150 observations of 
developed market acquisitions by the acquirer firms in the sample.  These observations 
cover M&A transactions that result in a change in majority control in the target firm as 
well as acquisitions of minority shares – a distinction that is explored in detail in later 
sections.   
 
2.1  Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in Emerging Markets 
 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of M&A transactions in emerging markets over 
time by region of target, by target sector, and by country or region of acquirer. The first 
panel shows the number of M&A transactions of targets in Asia and Latin America.  The 
number of M&A transactions increased in both regions over time, with a particularly 
large increase in the 1998-2002 period (Figure 1).  Throughout the sample period the 
number of cross-border M&A transactions in Latin America exceeds the number of 
M&A transactions in Asia (Table 1). When decomposed by sector, it appears that most   9
target firms are either in the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE), manufacturing, or 
utilities sectors.  The M&A transactions appear evenly split between “tradables” and 
“nontradables” sectors.  The bottom panel of the table shows the decomposition by the 
acquirer’s country of origin.  US firms acquire roughly 40–50% of the emerging-market 
targets while European firms acquire 20-30%.
3  Firms in Singapore and Hong Kong made 
a large number of M&A transactions in emerging Asia during 1998-2002. 
The difference in the timing of M&A activity in the two regions is largely due to 
differences in the regulations governing foreign participation in domestic capital markets.  
Both regions undertook capital market liberalizations in the middle to late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  However, the degree of openness varied across countries.  Latin America 
began its process of capital market liberalization in the early 1990s and actively sought 
foreign investment in its newly privatized industries.  The market for corporate control in 
Asia was more restricted as evidenced by the low volume of mergers and acquisition 
activity prior to the Asian Crisis in 1997.    
In many countries in East Asia, foreign investors were explicitly prohibited from 
gaining a controlling share in local firms.  For example, in 1996 the ceiling on the amount 
of stock foreigners could acquire in all Korean companies without the approval of the 
board of directors was only 18%.  Another feature of the market for corporate control in 
Korea was that cross-holdings across business groups (Chaebols) were substantial.  At 
the same time, the voting rights of institutional and minority shareholders were limited.  
As a result, the founder family could effectively control a business group with a relatively 
small direct ownership stake in the group.  
                                                 
3 This pattern differs across regions.  US and Spanish acquirers account for a larger share of targets in Latin 
America, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore account for a larger share in Asia.    10
This situation changed dramatically as a consequence of the financial crises that 
swept through the region during 1997.  The IMF bail-out packages to Thailand, Korea, 
and Indonesia imposed additional conditions such as restructuring domestic capital 
markets to allow foreign competition in the market for corporate control.  The policy 
recommendations had a dramatic effect on M&A activity in the region.  Figures 2a and 
2b show the volume of cross-border M&A in Thailand and Korea, highlighting the 
relevant changes in policy.  The Thai agreement largely affected the foreign ownership of 
real estate and financial companies.  The regulations changed in the second half of 1997, 
and cross-border mergers and acquisitions peaked shortly thereafter.  Similarly, in Korea, 
regulations allowing foreigners to obtain controlling shares of Korean firms and to 
establish banking subsidiaries in Korea occurred in late 1997 and early 1998.  Cross-
border transactions rapidly increased thereafter, peaking at $10 billion in 1999.   
Table 2 shows the change in the extent of corporate control resulting from the 
M&A transactions included in this paper.   The columns of the table show the extent of 
ownership of the target prior to the acquisition, while the rows indicate post-acquisition 
ownership shares.  The data show that in 842 out of 1011 transactions, the acquirer had 
no ownership stake in the target prior to the announcement.  In 659 transactions (490+ 
138+31) or about 65% of the sample, the acquisition leads to a majority or near complete 
transfer of control to the acquirer.  Note that in about 10% of the sample, the acquirer had 
majority ownership of the target prior to the acquisition. 
Table 3 presents the transaction details for a sample of 62 US firms which 
engaged in M&A activity in both developed and emerging markets.  Panel A shows that 
the 66% of the total M&A transactions are in the US as compared to 25% in other 
developed markets and 10% in emerging markets.  Tender offers, although receiving   11
significant attention in the domestic literature, are a small portion of the overall sample.  
Instead, it is three times more frequent for an emerging-market transaction to be privately 
negotiated.  Method of payment data was not available for all observations.  For 
observations with data, cash is the most common method of payment with all-cash 
acquisitions being six times more common than all-stock acquisitions.  This pattern holds 
for targets in the United States, other developed markets, and emerging markets.   
Divestitures represent approximately 30% of the total sample with a higher proportion of 
spin-offs in the target regions outside of the US. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the sample of mergers and acquisitions made by 
US firms domestically includes a wide range of deal values with a minimum transaction 
value of $0.75 million and a maximum value of $65.59 billion.  The median transaction 
value is $100 million.  The median transaction values for targets in other developed and 
emerging markets are comparable to the domestic observations.  The median transaction 
value for targets in developed markets other than the US is $71.3 million and $73.1 
million for targets in emerging markets.  Typically, for targets in the US or other 
developed markets, the average target stake acquired is 84.47% and 74.95%, respectively.  
For targets in emerging markets, majority control is acquired in approximately half the 
observations, with an average control stake of 50.94% being acquired.     
 
2.2  Measuring Returns 
The most statistically reliable evidence on whether M&A activity creates value 
for shareholders comes from traditional event studies, where the average abnormal stock 
market reaction to a cross-border acquisition announcement is used to gauge the creation 
or destruction of value (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001).  In efficient capital   12
markets, stock prices adjust quickly to news of the acquisition and incorporate the 
acquisition’s impact on expected changes in the value of the combined firm.  At the 
announcement date, the combined firm values minus the pre-announcement stand-alone 
firm values reflect the market’s assessment of the value creation or destruction resulting 
from the acquisition.  To the extent that the real option of making an acquisition is 
embedded in the acquirer’s stock price before the announcement is made, the returns on 
the announcement date suffer from attenuation bias.   
This paper uses weekly stock price data to compute three different measures of 
returns for the acquirer and target firms, as well as the combined firm.  The first measure 
is the raw buy-and-hold return over the relevant event window around the acquisition 
announcement.  The second measure computes the raw returns minus the market returns 
over the event window. The third measure computes the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) over the event window using a market model as follows: 
  it i i mt it RR α βε = ++ . (1) 
The coefficients αi and βi are estimated for a given firm over a one-year interval 
starting eighteen months prior to the announced acquisition and ending six months before 
the announcement.  The coefficients are then used to compute weekly expected returns 
around the acquisition announcement.  The abnormal return is defined as the difference 
between the actual return and the expected return in the event window.  Abnormal returns 
are cumulative, due to continuous compounding over the event window.  The market 
returns used in the estimation are the broadest market index available for a particular 
country.  For target firms, return data is dropped from sample if during the event window 
the target security did not change price for more than two consecutive weeks.  Acquirer 
and target returns are calculated in terms of the local currency. Joint returns are based on   13
returns in US dollars and a market-capitalization-weighted average of individual acquirer 
and target returns.  The event window returns are standardized to monthly returns.   
We report results for a three-week event window which includes the week before, 
the week of, and the week after the announcement.  Since this paper focuses on targets in 
emerging stock markets where trading may be thin, the estimations were also repeated 




3.  How does the Stock Market React to Cross-border M&A Transaction 
Announcements? 
 
If markets are efficient, changes in stock prices provide a summary statistic for 
changes in the fundamentals.  To that extent, the responses of firms’ stock prices to the 
announcement of an M&A transaction reflect news about the present value of future cash 
flows.  This section addresses the following question:  Do acquisitions by foreign firms in 
emerging markets create value?   
An acquisition can lead to a creation of value measured by joint returns if the cash 
flows of the merged firm are greater than the sum of its parts, namely, the cash flows of 
the two stand-alone firms.  Table 4 displays the stock price reactions for the full sample 
of acquirers and targets as well as the joint returns for the combined firms.
5  J o i n t  
announcement returns for acquirers and targets are positive and fairly similar across the 
different measures of returns and across the different event windows.  Based on raw 
returns, joint returns range from 1.73% to 2.28%, and are slightly smaller for market-
                                                 
4 The estimations were also conducted for acquirer firms with a three-day event window commonly used in 
the literature based on developed market returns which includes the day before, the day of, and the day 
after the announcement.   
5 The results include the stock price data for all acquirers and all targets, not just the sample of matched 
acquirer and target firms.  The sample of acquiring firms is greater than the sample of target firms because 
of stock price data availability.    14
adjusted returns, ranging from 1.08% to 1.79%.  The average combined market-adjusted 
announcement returns involving targets from East Asia is 2.34% and in Latin America is 
0.86%, although Latin American returns are not statistically significant.   
 
3.1  Joint Returns Increase When a Developed-Market Acquirer Gains Majority 
Control of an Emerging-Market Target 
 
In a world with incomplete contracts, the allocation of ownership within firms 
becomes important (Grossman and Hart, 1986).  If the acquisition results in a transfer of 
control, it will shift the boundary of the acquiring firm and can alter the acquiring firm’s 
incentives to transfer technology or invest in the target.  The stock price reactions of the 
acquiring and target firms, when a cross-border acquisition leads to a majority control of 
the target firm by the foreign owner, capture the importance of acquiring control.  The 
acquisition of majority control may be more important in countries with poor protection 
and enforcement of the minority shareholder rights (La Porta, Lopez-de- Silanes, Shliefer 
and Vishny, 1999).   
If the transfer of control leads to an increase in investment and transfer of 
technology, joint returns should increase with control.  The last panel of Table 4 displays 
average three-week announcement returns for a subsample of cross-border M&A 
transactions where the developed-market acquirer gains majority control of the emerging-
market target.  The magnitude of value creation increases when the acquirer gains 
majority control of the target in comparison to the results for the full sample in the first 
panel.  The average joint acquirer and target announcement return is 5.89% in market-
adjusted terms over the three-week window and is significantly higher statistically when 
compared to transactions where the acquirer does not gain majority control.        15
The paper now turns to formal estimations to explore the hypothesis that the 
acquisition of majority control drives value creation in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
4.  Does the Acquisition of Majority Control Drive Value Creation Through Cross-
Border M&A Transactions? 
 
The benchmark regression specification for examining the effects of acquisition 




it i i j it
j
R MAJORITYCONTROL CONTROLS α βγ ε
=
=+⋅ + + ∑   (2) 
The left-hand side variable,  it R , represents market-adjusted returns for the three-
week window that begins one week before and ends one week after the announcement of 
the acquisition. The intercept term, αi,  measures the magnitude of the average 
announcement return over the three-week event window.  MAJORITYCONTROLi is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the acquirer owns a 50% or more share of 
the target following the acquisition and did not have control before.
6    
Table 5 presents the estimates for joint returns in the three-week window 
surrounding the cross-border acquisition announcement.  Recall that estimating (2) 
without the majority control variable yields an estimate of the average change in joint 
returns surrounding an acquisition announcement. The coefficient estimate on the 
constant is 0.018 in Column 1a and is significant at the 5% level.  This indicates that joint 
returns increase significantly in the three-week announcement event window.   
Column 1b shows the results for the benchmark regression in (2).  The magnitude 
of the coefficient on the MAJORITYCONTROL variable is 0.068 and is significant at the 
                                                 
6 The regressions were also run including country-fixed effects.  In general, country effects were 
insignificant.    16
1% level.  The estimate suggests that the acquisition of majority control of the target 
drives joint returns up by 6.8% in the three-week event window surrounding the 
acquisition announcement.  The coefficient on the constant term in Column 1a shows 
that, on average, joint returns increase by 1.8% when majority control is not included as 
an explanatory variable.  Taking the difference in the coefficients, the result suggests that, 
conditional on acquiring majority control, average joint returns increase by 5% compared 
to the case when majority control is not acquired.  Note that the constant term becomes 
insignificant after conditioning on acquiring majority control of the target.   
The magnitude of the coefficient estimate on MAJORITYCONTROL ranges from 
0.058 to 0.078 in the two regression specifications shown in Columns 1c and 1d and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications.  Columns 1c and 1d explore 
whether the existence of a prior relationship between the acquirer and the target firm has 
an impact on joint returns.  The acquirer is classified as having a prior relationship with 
the target if the acquirer had an equity stake in the target prior to the acquisition 
announcement.  The inclusion of the existence of a prior relationship by itself does not 
have a statistically significant impact on joint announcement period returns as seen in 
Column 1c.   
Joint returns increase if the acquirer gains majority control after the acquisition, 
conditional on the existence of a prior relationship between the acquirer and the target 
(Column 1d).  PRIOR RELATION*CONTROL captures the marginal effect of acquiring 
majority control conditional on the existence of a prior relationship between the acquirer 
and the target.  The magnitude of this coefficient estimate is 0.07, and it is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  Note that the raw effect of acquiring majority control is 
0.058.  The total effect is the sum of the coefficients for the raw and marginal effects.    17
Thus, the total effect of acquiring majority control, conditional on the existence of a prior 
relationship between the acquirer and the target is 12.8% on joint returns.   
Save for the acquisition of majority control, a whole host of other factors may 
also affect the creation of value through cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  The 
estimations below explore alternative explanations that may be responsible for the 
positive announcement returns that accompany cross-border M&A transactions. 
 
4.1  Alternative Explanations: Do Synergies Affect the Creation of Value? 
It is a common assumption that for both the acquirer and target firms to benefit 
from the synergies that accrue from an acquisition, the two firms must be related in some 
way (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988).  The two firms could be related because they are in 
the same industry, or through a vertical value chain.  Since it is difficult to measure 
synergies directly the estimation procedure tests for the opposite case of diversifying 
transactions where it would be hard to make a case for the existence of synergies (Berger 
and Ofek, 1995).  The estimation procedure includes an industry diversification variable 
to see whether returns are higher when the target and the acquiring firm are in the same 
two-digit industry.   
The DIVERSIFY variable in Column 1e captures industrial diversification through 
the acquisition.  The coefficient estimate is negative but statistically insignificant.  The 
statistical insignificance of the coefficient estimate suggests that the acquisition of a 
target in an unrelated line of business does not affect joint returns in the acquisition-
announcement period.   Out of 380 transactions where SIC code information was 
available for both the acquirer and the target, 129 transactions are classified as 
diversifying transactions.     18
When examining the effects of M&A activity in unrelated lines of business in the 
cross-border context, an additional case must be considered.  Value creation in this case 
can be associated with the acquisition of a cash-starved emerging-market target by a 
cash-rich developed-market acquirer, regardless of industrial overlap.  A high number of 
M&A transactions between unrelated industries could in fact be a sign of cash-motivated 
mergers.  If liquidity or cash is the main motivation for the acquisition, rather than 
technological synergies, the incidence of M&A transactions in unrelated industries may 
increase during periods of financial crises.  The provision of liquidity may have been an 
especially important factor during the Asian financial crisis, when firms were unable to 
borrow due to their high levels of dollar-denominated debt.  In our sample 18 out of 58 
observations that are recorded as having taken place during a crisis are diversifying 
transactions.   To test the effect of liquidity-motivated sales by cash-strapped firms, the 
diversification dummy, DIVERSIFY, is interacted with a financial crisis dummy, CRISIS.  
The CRISIS dummy takes a value of one during a crisis and is zero otherwise.  The effect 
is statistically insignificant.  
 
4.2  Alternative Explanations:  Do Crisis Periods Affect the Creation of Value? 
 
The factors motivating an acquisition may change during periods of crisis.   
During periods of relative calm, cross-border M&A activity can be attributed to factors 
such as the transfer of technology, synergies, vertical specialization, management 
externalities, differences in the cost of capital, and the acquisition of control.  During 
crisis periods the same factors may continue to drive cross-border M&A activity.   
However, a number of additional factors, such as the presence of financially distressed or 
liquidity-constrained targets and increases in the bargaining power of the foreign   19
acquirers, may also become important drivers of cross-border M&A activity.  If this is 
indeed true then crisis periods should coincide with greater joint acquirer and target 
gains.   
A country-specific dummy for financial crisis, CRISIS, is included in Column 1j 
of Table 5 to see if the joint returns from an acquisition are systematically different 
during periods of financial turmoil in emerging markets.
7 The point estimate for the 
CRISIS variable is statistically insignificant.   
 
4.3  Alternative Explanations: Do Changes in Regulations or Relative Bargaining 
Power Drive the Creation of Value? 
 
A number of factors could affect value creation and the distribution of gains 
between the acquirer and the target firm.  Acquirer and target size are included in the 
estimations as possible indicators of firm bargaining power. Acquirer cash is included to 
pick up possible effects of liquidity provision for the target.  Columns 1f and 1g of Table 
5 show that the point estimates for TARGET SIZE and ACQUIRER SIZE are statistically 
insignificant.  Column 1h shows that there is no significant statistical relationship 
between joint announcement returns and the amount of cash the acquirer has on hand.  A 
caveat to bear in mind is that cash on hand does not provide an indication of the access to 
cash that the acquiring firm may have.  ACQUIRER CASH in column 1h provides a 
proxy, albeit an imperfect one, of the acquirer’s access to cash.  The effect of this 
variable on joint returns is statistically insignificant. 
Columns 1k and 1l explore whether the acquirer or target being in the finance, 
insurance, or real estate sector affects joint returns.  Dummies for the acquirer and target 
                                                 
7 The crises included are Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), Malaysia (1997), Korea (1997), Indonesia 
(1997), Philippines (1997), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2001).  The crisis dummy takes a value of one 
from six months prior to the crisis to one year following the crisis.    20
being in the FIRE sector are included to control for the possibility that the particular 
regulatory restrictions in that sector (on banks, in particular) may have a systematic effect 
on the returns to M&A transactions.  Again, the coefficient estimates for the ACQUIRER 
IN  FIRE  and  TARGET IN  FIRE  dummies are statistically insignificant.  Finally, the 
hypothesis that the regional location of the target affects joint announcement returns is 
explored in Column 1i.  The coefficient for the TARGET IN  ASIA variable is statistically 
insignificant suggesting that regional factors do not explain joint returns.   
The coefficients on the interaction terms between the independent variables 
included in regression specifications 1e-1l and the majority control variable are all 
insignificant.  See Table 5 for details. 
 
4.4  Alternative Explanations: Do Deal Characteristics Drive the Creation of Value?   
The estimations were also run including various deal and target characteristics 
reported in the previous literature as determinants of joint returns.  The additional 
variables tested include whether the target was bankrupt, there was a competing bidder, 
or an unsolicited bid, the target was a division, the deal was a new joint venture, the 
target was being privatized, the deal was privately negotiated, and whether the deal was a 
tender offer.  None of these additional variables explain acquirer returns when an 
emerging-market target is acquired.  A variable to capture the impact of the medium of 
payment was created as the fraction of cash paid in an acquisition relative to the total 
cash plus equity.  The method of payment also proved insignificant in explaining joint 
returns.    
In summary, the evidence from the formal panel estimations suggest that joint 
returns for the acquirers and targets increase significantly when a cross-border acquisition   21
is announced.  The increase in joint returns is linked to the acquisition of majority control 
of the target.  Joint returns are also significantly related to the acquisition of majority 
control, conditional on the existence of a previous relationship between the acquirer and 
the target.  These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of controls for acquirer 
and target characteristics.   
   
5.  Shareholders of Both Developed Market Acquirers As Well As Emerging-Market 
Targets Gain from Cross-Border M&A Transactions 
 
Based on US data, previous studies have found evidence of overall value creation 
through mergers and acquisitions (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001).   Typically, 
joint returns tend to be positive, but following the Williams Act (1968), the lion’s share 
of the joint gains accrue to target shareholders leaving little for the shareholders of the 
acquiring firms (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Brickley, Jarrell, and Netter, 1988).  This 
section provides evidence about the distribution of the joint gains that arise from cross-
border M&A transactions.   
The first panel of Table 6A shows that shareholders of developed market firms 
reap significant gains when an emerging-market target is acquired.  For the full sample of 
developed-market acquirers, the average announcement return in the event window that 
begins one week before and ends one week after the acquisition announcement ranges 
from 2.43% to 3.05% depending on the returns measure used.    
The fact that acquiring firms realize positive returns when an acquisition is 
announced in an emerging market may suggest that developed-market acquirers have 
greater bargaining power relative to the emerging-market targets.  Acquirers may have 
greater bargaining power, because fewer bidders compete for emerging-market targets,   22
cash-strapped targets have liquidity needs, or changes in government policies help 
facilitate foreign M&A transactions.   
An alternative interpretation for the increase in acquirer returns may be 
asymmetric information between the acquirer and the target about the target’s true 
fundamental value.  In order for the target firm to negotiate the best possible offer, the 
target must be in a position to form an accurate estimate of its fundamental value.  If the 
target is uncertain about its true stand-alone value, the firm may undervalue its assets.  
On the other hand, if acquirers are better able to assess the synergies from the merger, 
acquirers may be able to select and execute only those transactions that result in 
significant gains for them.  The ability of acquirer firms to form a better estimate of the 
target’s true value has particular significance in emerging markets where the stock price 
is often viewed as an especially noisy estimate of true firm values.   
Announcement returns for target firms are also positive and statistically 
significant.  In local currency terms, the average market-adjusted return for the target 
firm in the three-week event window ranges from 6.68% to 6.87%.  On average, M&A 
transactions in emerging markets create value for acquirer as well as target firm 
shareholders.     
Panels B and C in Table 6A report the acquirer and target returns by region.  In 
East Asia, acquirer gains range from 2.7% to 3.45% and are significant at the 5% level.  
Acquirer gains in Latin America are also positive, ranging from 1.89% to 2.23%, and 
again are significant at the 5% level.  Targets also gain, especially in Latin America.  In 
Asia, the target returns are 5.17% and in Latin America target returns are 9.68%.   
Acquirers will also gain from M&A transactions that achieve control of the target 
firm.  This gain can be the result of the total gains being higher and the target and   23
acquirer splitting these gains in a constant ratio.  Alternatively, acquirers may pay a 
different price when they acquire control of the target.   
The impact of the foreign acquirer gaining majority control on the target’s stock 
price is less clear.  On the one hand, if the market expects that the acquirer will transfer 
better technology and provide access to cheaper capital to the target, its stock price will 
increase.  On the other hand if the foreign acquisition dilutes the ability of the previous 
owners to exercise private benefits of control, the target’s stock price may fall or rise 
(Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  Panel D in Table 6A shows that when the acquirer gains 
majority control of the target, the average monthly market-adjusted announcement return 
using a three-week event window is 3.99% for acquirer firms and 8.92% for target firms.  
Both acquirer and target returns increase with the acquisition of majority control.  
Turning to the formal estimations, Table 7 presents the results for the acquisition 
announcement returns for acquirer firms.  Column 2a shows that the coefficient for the 
average announcement returns for the acquirers is 0.024 and is significant at the 5% level.  
This estimate suggests that acquirer monthly abnormal returns increase by 2.4% in the 
three-week cross-border acquisition announcement window.  This estimate corroborates 
the evidence presented using the raw data that, on average, cross-border M&A 
transactions create value for developed-market acquirers when the target is in an 
emerging market. 
The coefficient for MAJORITYCONTROL is 0.033 and is significant at the 5% 
level in Column 2b.  The estimate suggests that acquirer returns rise by 3.3% if the 
acquirer gains majority control of the target.  Column 2d shows that the magnitude for the 
estimate for PRIOR RELATION*CONTROL is 0.06.  The estimate is significant at the 
10% level.  The estimate suggests that conditional on the existence of a prior relationship   24
between the acquirer and the target, the acquisition announcement results in a 6% 
increase in acquirer returns if the acquisition results in majority control of the target.   
The coefficient estimate for the DIVERSIFY variable in Table 7 (column 2e) is 
also negative and insignificant suggesting that the industrial diversification does not 
explain acquirer returns.  The results in Columns 2f-2l demonstrate a similar pattern to 
the results for joint returns in the three-week announcement window.  After controlling 
for variables such as acquirer size, target size, acquirer cash, a crisis dummy, and whether 
the acquirer or the target are in the financial sector, the coefficient on 
MAJORITYCONTROL is significant in alternative regression specifications.  According 
to the regression estimates, the increase in acquirer returns ranges from 3.1% to 4.6% in 
alternative specifications.  The increase in acquirer returns, in turn, suggests that cross-
border M&A transactions in emerging markets create value for developed-market 
acquirers. 
Table 8 shows the results for target returns.  The constant term in Column 3a 
captures the average increase in target returns when a cross-border acquisition 
announcement is made.  The magnitude of the coefficient is 0.069 and is significant at the 
1% level.  The estimate suggests that, on average, target returns increase by 6.9% when a 
cross-border acquisition is announced. 
The results in Columns 3b to 3d suggest that when MAJORITYCONTROL is 
included in the regression specification, the intercept term is positive but statistically 
significant in only one instance.  Moreover, there is no statistical relationship between 
target returns and the acquisition of majority control by the developed-market acquirer.  
The coefficient on MAJORITYCONTROL  is not statistically significant in any 
specification.  It appears that target returns cannot be explained by the acquisition of   25
majority control by the acquirer.  However, given the small sample size and the fact that 
emerging-market returns are measured with greater noise, the lack of statistical 
significance should be interpreted with caution.   
The regression specifications in Columns 3a to 3d were also run without including 
MAJORITYCONTROL as an explanatory variable on the right hand side.  The intercept 
term is statistically significant in all specifications at the 1% or 5% levels.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient on the intercept term ranges from 0.031 to 0.069 in 
alternative regression specifications.  The evidence suggests that, on average, target 
returns increase from 3.4% to 9.6% in the three-week announcement window 
surrounding the cross-border acquisition announcement.   
To get a sense of the magnitude of the wealth creation from a typical acquisition, 
the Table 6b shows the median and average market returns and market capitalization 
figures for acquirers and target firms.  The median equity market value for the developed 
market acquirer firms in the sample is $12.91 billion.  Also in Panel A, the 0.91% median 
market adjusted return corresponds to a $117.17 million market capitalization gain for 
acquirer firm shareholders over the three week window in the full sample.   
The average market-adjusted return for acquirers in transactions where control is 
acquired is 4.06% compared with an average acquirer return of 0.47% when control is not 
required.  A Wilcox-signed-rank test of medians also shows that acquirer returns are 
significantly higher in transactions where the acquirer gains majority control of the target 
in comparison to transactions where majority control is not acquired (p=0.008).  In 
transactions where the acquirer gains majority control, the median acquirer return of 
3.97% corresponds to a median market-capitalization gain of $512.1 million—the 
acquirer value gains are four times higher than the full sample (Panel B).  Panel C shows   26
that the median acquirer return in transactions where majority control is not acquired is 
0.42% and leads to median market capitalization gain of $54 million.
8     
The median equity market value for an emerging-market target in Table 6B is 
$201.6 million.  For the full sample, a 1.55% median market-adjusted return corresponds 
to a $3.12 million increase in the market capitalization value for target firm shareholders 
over the three week event window.  The Wilcox-signed-rank test shows that the median 
target returns are not significantly different in transactions where the acquirer gains 
majority control (p=0.367).  In transactions where the acquirer gains majority control, the 
median market capitalization gain for target firm shareholders is $1.69 million and $2.83 
million in transactions where the acquirer does not gain majority control.  The evidence 
from the back-of-the-envelope value gain calculations in Table 6B suggest that, distinct 
from domestic transactions, the distribution of gains from cross-border M&A transactions 
shifts in favor of acquirer firms. 
 
5.  Do Foreign Acquirers Take Advantage of Emerging-Market Targets? Revisiting 
Value Creation During Crisis Periods 
    
If the bargaining power of foreign acquirers increases during crises, the 
distribution of the value gains may change in favor of the acquirers.  Alternatively, the 
price that acquirers pay for the target during a crisis may be different compared to periods 
of financial calm.  Crisis periods generally result in a collapse in beliefs about future 
payoffs in the emerging stock markets.  If these beliefs are not rational and acquirers have 
greater confidence in the fundamentals, acquirers may realize further gains during times 
                                                 
8 The value gains were also estimated on a transaction by transaction basis.  The median market 
capitalization gain is $309.03 million in transactions which result in a transfer of majority control to the 
acquirer compared with $0.99 million in transactions that do not result in a transfer of majority control.   27
of crisis.  The identification strategy employed in this paper allows for the following test 
of whether the acquirers paid different prices for the targets during a crisis.  Acquirer 
returns in crisis periods should be higher than in non-crisis periods, if targets are acquired 
at bargain prices during a crisis.   
Table 9 displays the results for the acquirers.  Columns 1a to 3a show that 
acquirer returns in the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.  Note that the time 
dummy for the early, pre-crisis period (1988-1995) is negative and significant.  However, 
the time dummy for the middle period (1997-1999) in Column 1b which coincides with 
the Asian crisis is statistically insignificant.  The data suggest that acquirer returns did not 
increase during the crisis.  The time dummy for the post-Asian-crisis period (2000-2003) 
in Column 3a of Table 9, on the other hand, is significantly positive.  Moreover, when 
MAJORITY CONTROL is included in the regression specifications in Columns 4a to 6a, 
the coefficient estimates on the time dummies are no longer significant.  The coefficient 
estimate for MAJORITY CONTROL is positive and significant at the 5% level.  At first 
pass, the effect of acquiring majority control appears to be invariant to the state of the 
financial markets in Panel A.   The estimations in Panel B explore the impact of financial 
crisis on the returns to acquirers and targets in greater detail below.   
    Sovereign bond spreads can be used as a measure for the cost of capital in 
emerging markets.  As a robustness check, the estimates include the relative value of the 
JP Morgan Emerging Market’s Bond Index (EMBI) spread as an explanatory variable.  
Column 1b in Panel B of Table 9 shows that the coefficient estimate for the EMBI spread 
is positive and significant—as sovereign spreads widen, acquirer returns increase.  The 
result suggests that acquirer returns increase as the cost of capital increases in emerging 
markets.    28
Note that the cost of capital is likely to increase further in emerging markets 
during financial crises.  The regression specification in Column 2b of Table 9 includes 
the effect of the EMBI spread conditional on there being a crisis in the emerging market.  
While the raw effect of the EMBI spread remains positive and significant in explaining 
announcement returns for acquirers, the coefficient on the interaction term between the 
spread and crisis, EMBI*CRISIS, is statistically insignificant.  The result suggests that 
the effect of EMBI spreads on acquirer returns does not appear to change during crisis 
periods.  The evidence, therefore, does not confirm that targets were being acquired at 
bargain prices during the crisis. 
Finally, Column 3b examines the effect of acquiring majority control conditional 
on the cost of capital as measured by the EMBI spread.  While the coefficient estimate 
for MAJORITY CONTROL is positive and significant, the effect of acquiring control 
conditional on the EMBI spread (EMBI*CONTROL) is statistically insignificant.   
Similarly, the coefficient estimate on EMBI*CRISIS*CONTROL in Column 4b is also 
statistically insignificant.  The two sets of results suggest that the impact of acquiring 
control on acquirer returns is not significantly different between crisis and non crisis 
periods.   
 
6.  Selection Bias: Do the Acquirers in the Sample Experience Positive 
Announcement Returns When They Acquire Developed Market Targets? 
 
The results reported thus far suggest that there are significant gains to acquirers 
from emerging-market M&A transactions.  Although the estimations include controls for 
a number of factors, the results may largely be driven by acquirer-firm characteristics that 
have little to do with the particular circumstances in emerging markets.  For example,   29
note that the median size of a developed market acquirer in the sample is $12.91 billion, 
more than 60 times larger than the median emerging-market target.   
It is possible that large firms have greater bargaining power or an informational 
advantage in making acquisitions in general and not in emerging markets in particular.  
The following questions arise in this context.  Are the gains to acquirers specific to 
emerging-market acquisitions?  Or, do the acquirer firms in the sample reap gains even 
when they make acquisitions in developed markets?  If the acquirer-firm returns increase 
when they announce an acquisition regardless of whether it is in an emerging or a 
developed market, then a sample selection bias in the form of acquirer characteristics 
may be driving the results in this paper.  However, if the acquirer-firm returns increase 
only when they acquire an emerging-market target, then the appropriate interpretation of 
the increase in acquirer returns may be that the acquisition of control in emerging 
markets, in particular, is driving the result.   
To test whether majority control matters outright or only in situations where 
institutions are poor, the announcement returns for developed-market acquirers are 
compared between developed- and emerging-market M&A transactions.  The sample is 
extended to include the acquisitions made by developed-market acquirers in France, 
Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, Italy, Spain, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore in addition to the emerging-market acquisitions.   
Table 10 presents the results.  Column 1a shows that in the full set of targets, 
acquirers now experience negative but statistically insignificant returns in the three-week 
event window.  The results in Column 1b show that when a dummy variable for an 
emerging-market target is introduced into the regression specification, developed-market 
acquirers experience positive and statistically significant returns of 3.3% in the three-  30
week event windows.  Taken together, the results in Column 1a and 1b suggest that 
shareholder wealth effects for developed-market acquirers are positive only when an 
acquisition is made in an emerging market and not in developed markets.    
Column 1c shows that while the coefficient on the emerging-market-target 
dummy variable has a magnitude of 0.033 and continues to be significant when the 
acquisition of MAJORITY CONTROL is introduced as an explanatory variable on the 
right-hand side.  However, the coefficient on the MAJORITY CONTROL is negative and 
statistically insignificant suggesting, when developed-market targets are pooled together 
with emerging-market targets, the acquisition of control per se does not result in positive 
returns for developed-market acquirers.   
In column 1d, MAJORITY CONTROL is interacted with the emerging markets 
dummy variable.  The coefficient on MAJORITYCONTROL*EMERGING MARKET 
TARGET is 0.075 and is significant at the 5% level.  The result suggests that conditional 
on the target being in an emerging market, the acquisition of majority control results in 
positive returns for developed-market acquirers.   Note that the total effect of acquiring 
an emerging-market target on developed-market-acquirer returns is the sum of the 
coefficients on the raw effects of the EMERGING MARKET TARGET dummy variable 
and the MAJORITY CONTROL dummy variable and the condition effect of MAJORITY 
CONTROL*EMERGING MARKET TARGET which is equal to 0.056.  The sum of the 
coefficients suggests that, on average, developed-market-acquirer returns increase by 
5.6% when majority control is acquired in an emerging-market target.     
Columns 1e and 1f suggest that the acquisition of majority control leads to a 
positive and significant increase in acquirer returns when the regression specification 
includes a proxy for whether or not the acquirer had a relationship with the target firm   31
before the acquisition was announced.  The results show that the coefficient on 
MAJORITYCONTROL*EMERGING MARKET TARGET is 0.075 and 0.074 in the two 
columns, respectively, and is significant at the 5% level.  In contrast to the results in 
section 4, the acquisition of control in an emerging-market target for an acquirer that had 
a previous relationship with the target does not explain the increase in acquirer returns 
when a cross-border acquisition is announced.  The coefficients PREVIOUS 
RELATIONSHIP and PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP*EMERGING MARKET TARGET are 
statistically insignificant.   
The coefficient on MAJORITYCONTROL*EMERGING MARKET TARGET is 
0.075 and 0.077 in Columns 1g and 1h and is significant at the 5% level.  The two 
regression specifications also show that the impact on acquirer returns is negative and 
insignificant when US acquirers make unrelated acquisitions.  The coefficient on 
DIVERSIFY  and the coefficient on DIVERSIFY*EMERGING MARKET TARGET are 
both negative but not statistically significant.  The acquisition of majority control in the 
emerging-market target leads to a 7.5%-7.7% increase in acquirer returns when a cross-
border acquisition is announced even with the inclusion of industrial diversification as an 
explanatory variable on the right-hand side.    
Finally, Columns 1i and 1j examine whether the deal size has any explanatory 
power for US-acquirer announcement returns.  In both regression specifications, the 
value of the transaction has a positive but insignificant effect on acquirer returns.  The 
coefficient on MAJORITY CONTROL*EMERGING MARKET TARGET is 0.129 in the 
both columns and is significant at the 10% level.    
In summary, the results in this section suggest that when the sample of cross-
border M&A transactions announced by US acquirers in emerging markets is extended to   32
include M&A transactions in other developed markets, acquirer returns increase 
significantly only when the acquisition of an emerging-market target is announced.  The 
evidence therefore suggests that the increase in acquirer returns is not being driven by 
acquirer characteristics.  Rather, the acquisition of majority control of an emerging-
market target is the primary driver of acquirer returns when a cross-border acquisition is 
announced.  One explanation for the result that the acquisition of majority control appears 
to matter only in emerging markets is that the transfer of majority control may provide a 
mechanism through which acquirers are able to lend developed-market institutions in the 
form of improved property rights to emerging-market targets (Acemoglu and Johnson, 
2003; Bris and Cabolis, 2004).   
 
7.  Do Industry Characteristics Drive the Importance of Acquiring Majority Control 
in Emerging Markets?  
 
7.1 Does the R&D Intensity in the Target Firm’s Industry Matter? 
 
To investigate the factors that drive the importance of acquiring majority control, 
a number of alternative hypotheses are considered.  First, in the absence of control, weak 
institutions and legal environments in emerging markets may inhibit acquiring firms from 
making technology transfers to the target firms.  If acquiring firms hold back from 
transferring technology in emerging-market transactions which do not involve control, 
the impact of this effect should be the most acute in R&D-intensive industries.  Since 
patent and legal protection matter in R&D-intensive industries, the prediction is that the 
stock market’s reaction to transactions where control is acquired will be directly 
proportionate to the R&D intensity of an industry.   
To test the prediction that the R&D intensity of an industry matters, the paper 
constructs a metric of R&D intensity using US data.  Using all US firms in Compustat   33
from 1990 to 2002 the research and development expense (Compustat data item #46) is 
divided by net sales (Compustat data item #12).  Dividing by net sales normalizes the 
R&D expenses by the size of the firm.  This measure is sorted by 2-digit SIC codes and 
an average measure of R&D intensity by 2-digit SIC code is constructed.   The measure 
of R&D intensity is then matched by industry with the 2-digit SIC code of the emerging-
market targets.   
The findings are as follows.  Table 11 shows that the raw effect of the acquisition 
of control in an emerging-market target is positive and significant in alternative 
specifications.  In column 3, the marginal effect of control conditional on the level of 
R&D intensity is also positive and significant at the 1% level.  The sum of the 
coefficients on CONTROL and CONTROL*RDINTENSITY provides a measure of the 
total effect of control and R&D intensity on acquirer returns.  The sum of the two 
coefficients is 0.43 and suggests that acquirer returns increase by 4.3% when control is 
acquired in an R&D-intensive industry. 
It is worth noting that the RDINTENSITY measure also predicts whether control is 
acquired in any given transaction.  For example, compare a target, say, an electric power 
plant, with an average R&D intensity of 0.148 with a target which manufactures 
automobiles with an R&D intensity of 0.324.  Logit regression estimates with control as a 
right-hand side variable suggest the difference in the R&D intensity of the two industries 
predicts a 16% increase in the probability that control is acquired in the transaction.  The 
result is statistically significant at the 5% level.   
If it is the case that weak legal settings in emerging markets drives the importance 
of acquiring control, the effect should not be evident in developed markets.  When the 
estimations are run by pooling developed- and emerging-market targets, the results show   34
that the acquisition of control conditional on R&D intensity appears to matter only when 
the target is located in an emerging market.  Column 6 of Table 11 shows that the 
acquisition of control conditional on R&D intensity is positive and significant when the 
transaction involves an emerging-market target.  The coefficient on     
EMTARGET*CONTROL*RDINTENSITY is 0.044 and is significant at the 1% level.  On 
the other hand, the coefficient on CONTROL*RDINTENSITY which does not condition 
on the target being in an emerging market is negative and significant.   
R&D-intensive industries such as information technology and pharmaceuticals 
experienced very high returns in the late 1990s.  There is a concern, therefore, that the 
result of R&D intensity as a key determinant of acquirer returns is merely picking up the 
boom-time returns in these industries.  As a final robustness check for the result that 
R&D intensity matters in explaining acquirer returns in emerging markets, additional 
estimations were conducted by using industry-adjusted returns on the left-hand side.  The 
results remain qualitatively similar.  The coefficient estimate for 
CONTROL*RDINTENSITY when the target is in an emerging market remains positive 
and significant.     
 
7.2  Does the Dependence on External Finance, Investment Intensity, or Fixed 
Assets in the Target Firm’s Industry Matter? 
 
A second hypothesis may be that foreign acquirers are more likely to provide 
access to external-capital markets to emerging-market targets if they own a majority stake 
in these firms.  A measure of the dependence on external capital, EXCAP, in an industry 
is adapted from Rajan and Zingales (1998) as follows.  Using all US firms in Compustat 
from 1990 to 2002, we calculated their annual capital expenditures minus cash flow from 
operations divided by their capital expenditures.  Cash flow from operations is defined as   35
operating income before depreciation plus decreases in inventories plus decrease in 
receivables plus increase in payables.  An industry level average measure is constructed 
by 2-digit SIC code, and these results are matched to the 2-digit SIC code of the 
emerging-market targets.  The measure is designed to capture an industry’s dependence 
on external finance and whether this dependence makes an acquiring firm more likely to 
acquire control.  However, the estimations do not bear out this hypothesis.  The 
coefficient on the EXCAP measure interacted with the MAJORITY CONTROL does not 
explain the positive returns to acquiring firms when an emerging-market M&A 
transaction is announced. 
The third hypothesis for why majority control matters may be related to the 
degree of investment intensity in an industry.  A measure of investment intensity, 
INVMEASURE, is calculated by dividing capital expenditures by net sales for any given 
firm in Compustat from 1990-2002.  Capital expenditures are normalized by sales to be 
consistent with the R&D measure.  Industry-level averages are constructed by using the 
firm-level measures and matched with the 2-digit SIC codes of the emerging-market 
targets.   Once again, the measure of investment intensity does not explain the positive 
acquirer returns when majority control of the emerging-market target is acquired. 
The final hypothesis for why majority control may matter is that foreign acquirers 
may be more likely to transfer fixed assets when they have majority control of the 
emerging-market target.  To explore this hypothesis, FASSETMEASURE is constructed 
by dividing net property plant and equipment by net sales for all firms in Compustat from 
1990-2002.  Industry-level averages were matched to emerging-market-target 2-digit SIC 
codes.  The coefficient on the FASSETMEASURE interacted with the MAJORITY   36
CONTROL*EMTARGET is positive and significant.  However, this result holds for only 
the US acquirers in the sample. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  There has been considerable debate about the welfare effects of the boom in 
cross-border M&A transactions in emerging markets.  At the root of this debate is the 
question of whether cross-border mergers and acquisitions result in a creation of value 
through the transfer of corporate ownership from domestic to foreign investors and the 
distribution of the potential gains from the acquisition between shareholders of target and 
acquiring firms.  This paper uses the stock-price reaction of acquiring and target firms to 
the announcement of an acquisition as a summary statistic for value creation through 
foreign M&A transactions.  The acquirer and target firms’ stock price reaction to the 
announcement of an acquisition reveals information about (i) the potential wealth creation 
from the merger and (ii) how the gains and losses from an acquisition are assigned to the 
acquiring and target firms.  The stock market’s reaction to the information contained in 
the acquisition announcement reveals the market’s view of the transaction. 
The paper examines all transactions involving a developed-country acquirer and 
an emerging-market target between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 2002 for which 
stock-price data are available.  In general, the results from panel data estimations suggest 
that the stock market anticipates significant value creation from the merger for the target 
and the acquiring firms.  Joint monthly returns based on market-capitalization weighted 
returns in dollars increase by 1.8% when a cross-border acquisition is announced.  The 
benchmark results indicate that target firms benefit from the acquisition, experiencing 
average monthly returns of 6.69%.  Both sets of results are consistent with the findings in   37
the literature on domestic mergers and acquisitions.  In contrast to the previous literature 
that uses US data, the evidence suggests that acquirer returns also show a statistically 
significant increase of 2.4%. 
The benefits from the acquisition stem from the transfer of majority control from 
the emerging-market target to the developed-market acquirer.  The paper also compares 
acquirer returns for US firms when the acquisition is announced in a developed-market 
rather than in an emerging market.  The data suggest that positive acquirer returns are 
specific to M&A transactions in emerging markets, and that gaining corporate control is 
the key feature of transactions that deliver positive returns.  Joint return increases range 
from 5.8% to 7.8% when majority control is acquired.  Overall, the results in the paper 
suggest that the boom in foreign direct investment flows to emerging markets in the 
1990s led to a transfer of control to foreign acquirers and substantial gains to shareholders 
of both the acquiring and the target firms. 
   38
References 
Acemoglu, Daron and Simon H. Johnson (2003). "Unbundling Institutions."  MIT Department of 
Economics Working Paper No. 03-29. 
 
Aitken, Brian J. and Ann E. Harrison (1999). "Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela."  American Economic Review, Vol. 89, 605- 
618. 
 
Alchian, Armen, Robert Crawford, and Benjiman Klien (1978).  "Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process."  Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 297-326.   
 
Andrade, Gregor, Mark L. Mitchell, and Erik Stafford (2001). “New Evidence and Perspectives 
on Mergers.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, 103-120. 
 
Antras, Pol (2003). “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 118, No. 4, 1375-1418. 
 
Barber, Brad, Richard Lyon and Chih-Ling Tsai (1999). “Improved Methods for Tests of Long-
Run Abnormal Performance.”  Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 1, 165-201.   
 
Berger, Philip and Eli Ofek (1995). “Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value.” Journal of 
Finacial Economics, Vol. 37, No.1, 39-66.   
 
Bradley, Michael, Anand Desai, and E. Han Kim (1988). “Synergistic Gains from Corporate 
Acquisitions and their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring 
Firms.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, 3-40. 
 
Brickley, James, Gregg Jarrell, and Jeffrey Netter (1988).  “The Market for Corporate Control: 
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 1 
49-68. 
 
Bris, Arturo and Christos Cabolis (2004). “Adopting Better Corporate Governance: 
  Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers.” Mimeo, Yale School of Management. 
 
Caves, Richard E. (1996). Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. 2nd Edition, 
  Cambridge University Press. 
 
Coase, Ronald (1937). "The Nature of the Firm."  Economica, Vol. 4, No. 16, 386-405. 
 
Dyck, Alexander and Luigi Zingales (2004).  “The Private Benefits of Control.”  Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 59, No. 2, 533-596. 
 
Froot, Kenneth (1991).  "Japanese Foreign Direct Investment," in U.S.-Japan Economic 
Forum, Vol. 1, M. Feldstein and Y. Kosai, eds., National Bureau of Economic 
Research and Japan Center for Economic Research. 
   39
Froot, Kenneth and Jeremy Stein (1991). “Exchange Rates and Foreign DirectInvestment: 
An Imperfect Capital Markets Approach.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
106, No. 4, 1191-217. 
 
Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart (1986).  “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration.”  The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 
691-719. 
 
Jensen, Michael and Richard Ruback (1983).  "The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence."  Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, 5-50. 
 
Kindleberger, Charles (1969).  American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment. 
New Haven. Yale University Press. 
 
Krugman, Paul (1998).  "Firesale FDI." MIT Working Paper. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1998).  “Law 
and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, 1113-1155. 
 
Lang, Larry and Rene Stulz (1994), “Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification and Firm 
Performance.”  Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 6, 1248-1280. 
 
Moeller, Sara B., Frederik P. Schlingemann, and Rene M. Stulz (2004).  "Wealth Destruction on 
a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave."   
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. 
 
Perez-Gonzales, Francisco (2004).  “The Impact of Acquiring Control on Productivity: Evidence 
from Mexican Manufacturing Plants.”  Working Paper, Columbia University. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales (1998). “Financial Dependence and Growth.”  American 
Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, 559-586. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1979).  “Transaction Cost Economics:  The Governance of Contractual 
Relations.”  Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2, 233-261.     40






































   41
 
Figure 2a:  Deregulation of Foreign Ownership Restrictions Facilitates the Increase in Cross-Border M&A Activity. 

































The restriction on foreign ownership of office buildings and 
condominiums was lifted in end-April 1997 in an effort to shrink the 
country's oversupply of real estate. 5/97
The foreign ownership limit of 25% for financial institutions was lifted on a 
case-by-case basis. 10/97
The Bank of Thailand announced that foreign investors 
would be allowed to hold more than 49% of the shares in 
existing financial institutions for a period of 10 years 
without the approval of the Ministry of Finance. 11/97  42
Figure 2b:  Deregulation of Foreign Ownership Restrictions Facilitates the Increase in Cross-Border M&A Activity. 






























The ceiling on aggregate foreigners' 
ownership of Korean shares was 
increased to 55%. 12/97
Foreign banks and brokerage houses were allowed 
to establish subsidiaries if their equity capital was 
more than W200 million. 4/98
Foreign investors were allowed to take over corporations, except defense-related 
companies, and the ceiling on the amount of stock foreigners may acquire in all 
companies without the approval of the board of directors was abolished. 5/98  43
 
 Table 1.  The Frequency of Cross-Border M&A Transactions in Emerging Markets Varies by Time, 









Decomposition by Region of Target 
East  Asia  25 110 78 437 
Latin  America  35  239 184 520 
 
Decomposition by Target Sector 
Basic  Manufacturing  19 67 50  135 
Machinery & Electronics  8  60  48  205 
Utilities, Telecom & Transportation 2  37  29  165 
Wholesale & Retail Trade  2  21  15  69 
FIRE 8  47  57  165 
Hotels, Tourism & Misc. Services  2  20  15  103 
 
Decomposition by Country/Region of Acquirer 
Canada  5  51 30 90 
Europe  27 62 54  293 
Japan  9  18 10 74 
Singapore & Hong Kong  1  31  27  129 
United  States  18  187 141 371 
Notes: The table summarizes all cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving a public acquirer from a developed 
market and a public target from a developing market by region, by sector, and over time for all cross-border M&A 
transactions which were announced between 1988 and 2002.  The emerging markets include Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.  The developed markets include 
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.  Basic manufacturing is targets with 2-digit SIC codes 20-29; Machinery & Electronics is targets in 
SIC codes 30-39; Utilities, Telecom and Transportation is targets in SIC codes 40-49; Wholesale and Retail Trade is 
targets in SIC codes 50-59; FIRE is targets in SIC codes 60-69; Hotels, Tourism and Miscellaneous services is 
targets in SIC codes 70-89.  Data for M&A transactions, primary SIC codes, and target and acquirer nations is from 
SDC.  44
 
Table 2.   There Is Cross Sectional Variation in Post Acquisition Ownership through Cross-Border 
Mergers and Acquisitions.   
 


















































106 1  3  8  94 
Notes: The table summarizes cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving a public acquirer from a developed market 
and a public target from an emerging market by pre- and post-acquisition ownership.  The table covers all M&A 
transactions announced between 1988 and 2002 and for which control data is available.  Emerging markets include 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.  Developed markets 
include Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.  M&A transactions are identified and control information is collected from SDC data items “Percent 
Shares Acquired” and “Percent Shares Owned After Transaction.”  Control information is available for 1011 
observations.     45
 










Targets from other 
Developed Markets 
 
Targets from Emerging 
Markets 
Total M&A transactions  836  314  124 
Tender offer  33  7  9 
All-cash payment  257  102  65 
All-stock payment  59  7  2 
Payment mix of cash and 
stock 
18 2  1 
Target being privatized  2  6  2 
Acquisition privately 
negotiated 
107 35  22 
Target bankrupt  5  8  1 
Target being divested  218  119  44 















Targets in US  $1.24B  $100M  $0.75 M  $62.59B  44.4% 
 
























Target Stake Acquired 
Targets in US  84.47%  100%  1.1%  100%  67.3% 
Other developed market 
targets 
74.95% 100%  1%  100%  67.2% 
Emerging-market targets  50.94%  49%  0.37%  100%  57.3% 
Notes: This table summarizes the deal value and target stake acquired for the 62 US firms in the sample which 
announced M&A transactions in emerging markets and other M&A transactions in developed markets from 1990 to 
2002 by the geographic region where the target is present.  All data is collected from SDC.  Data was consistently 
available for all characteristics except method of payment which suffers from missing data in Panel A.  Data was also 
not consistently available for transaction value or target stake acquired and thus the percent of the sample with data is 
reported in the final column of Panel B.     46
Table 4.  Joint Returns Increase When a Cross-Border M&A Transaction Is Announced.  
Full Sample  
Joint Returns 
(US$)  Raw Returns  Market-Adjusted Returns 
 
-1:+1  2.28%**  1.79%** 
 
-2:+2  1.73%**  1.08%* 
 
N  224  221 
 






















     
 





















     
 














55  55 
     
Notes: This table summarizes average stock market reactions to the announcement of cross-border M&A transactions involving 
a public acquirer from a developed market and a public target from a developing market.  Averages are reported in standardized 
monthly return units.  The sample size is based on a subset of transactions where stock price data was available for acquirer-
target pairs (N=224).  -1:+1 is a symmetric 3-week event window and -2:+2 is a symmetric 5-week event window around the 
week of the announcement.  Returns are calculated using continuous compounding of the percent changes in the weekly closing 
stock prices (equivalent to a buy-and-hold methodology).   Raw returns are unadjusted average returns.  Market-adjusted 
returns are calculated by subtracting the market return from the raw return for any given firm.  Joint returns are calculated as 
market-capitalization-weighted average returns for both the target and the acquirer using dollar-denominated returns for both 
parties. *, ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.    47
Table 5.  The Acquisition of Majority Control of the Target Drives Joint Returns in Cross-Border M&A Transactions.  





































































         
Control*Prev 
Relationship 
         0.07* 
(0.039) 
         
 
Diversify 
       -0.0038 
(0.0150) 
        
 
Acquirer Size 
       9.16e-08 
(1.5e-07) 
      
 
Target Size 
        4.27-e06 
(3.4e-06) 
       
 
Acquirer Cash 
        1.8e-06 
(1.9e06) 
     
Target in Asia            0.001 
(0.015) 
   
 
Crisis Period 
           -0.006 
(0.020) 
   
Acquirer in 
FIRE 




Target in FIRE 
            0.001 
(0.018) 
R-squared  0.12  0.12 0.14  0.16 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12  0.12  0.12 
N  216  150 124  124 149 150 150 149 150 150  150  150 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of regressions where the dependent variable is joint (acquirer + target) abnormal returns during a 3-week event window 
(standardized to monthly return units) around the announcement date.  Mean coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.  All M&A 
transactions in the sample involve a public acquirer from a developed market and a public target from an emerging market.  Joint returns are market-capitalization- 
weighted averages of acquirer and target returns and US$-denominated.  Weekly abnormal returns are calculated using a market model and are continuously 
compounded, then standardized to monthly units.   The acquisition of control is a dummy variable identified if the acquirer holds 50% or more of the target firm’s 
equity following the acquisition and did not previously have control.  Previous relationship is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the acquirer held equity 
in the target firm prior to the acquisition.  Diversification is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the absolute value of the difference in SIC codes between 
acquirer and target is 1000 or greater.  Acquirer and target size and acquirer cash is measured in US$ million.  Emerging markets included are Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.  The developed markets include Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Crisis period is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the target country is in a 
currency crisis.  Acquirer and target FIRE dummies take on a value of one if the firm has an SIC code between 6000 and 6999.   *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.    48




Developed Market Acquirer 
(Local Currency Returns) 
 
             Emerging-Market Target  
(Local Currency Returns)                
 














-1:+1 3.05%***  2.43%**  6.68%***  6.87%*** 
-2:+2  2.00%** 1.26%  5.51%***  5.05%*** 
 





Developed Market Acquirer 
(Local Currency Returns) 
 
              Emerging-Market Target  







































Developed Market Acquirer 
(Local Currency Returns) 
              
              Emerging-Market Target  







































Developed Market Acquirer 
(Local Currency Returns)              
              
              Emerging-Market Target  
(Local Currency Returns)    
 














-1:+1  5.66%*** 3.99%***  9.87%*** 8.92%*** 
 
N 92  92 85  85 
 
Notes: This table summarizes average stock market reactions to the announcement of a cross-border acquisition involving a public 
acquirer from a developed market and a public target from a developing market for the full sample (Panel A) and by region (Panels B 
and C).  Panel D summarizes average stock market reactions to the announcement of a cross-border acquisition in which majority 
control is transferred to the acquirer.  Averages are reported in standardized monthly return units.  East Asian emerging markets 
include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.  Latin American emerging markets include Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico.  The developed markets include Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  The event window comprises a symmetric 3- or 5-week period.  Returns are 
calculated using continuous compounding of the percent changes in the weekly equity closing prices (equivalent to a buy and hold 
methodology).  Raw returns are unadjusted average returns.  Market-adjusted returns are alculated by subtracting the market return 
from the raw return for any given firm.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%  and 1% levels, respectively.     49
Table 6B.  Majority Control is Accompanied by Higher Value Gains for Acquirers and Targets. 
 




Developed-Market Acquirer  
(US$ Returns) 
 






                        (0.013) 
 
7.07%*** 










Panel B: Acquirer Gains Control of  Emerging-Market Target 
  
Developed-Market Acquirer  
(US$ Returns) 
 



















Panel C: Acquirer Does Not Gain Control of Emerging-Market Target 
  
Developed-Market Acquirer  
(US$ Returns) 
 



















Panel D:  Market Capitalization Values 
  
Developed-Market Acquirer  
(Market Capitalization) 
 















 Notes: This table summarizes average and median stock market reactions to the announcement of a cross-border acquisition 
involving a public acquirer from a developed market and a public target from a developing market for the full sample (Panel A), 
when the acquirer gains majority control (Panel B), and when the acquirer does not gain majority control (Panel C).  Panel D 
summarizes the average and median stock market capitalization for acquirer and target firms.  East Asian emerging markets include 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.  Latin American emerging markets include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Mexico.  The developed markets include Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  The event window comprises a symmetric 3- week period which includes the week before 
and the week following the announcement.  Returns are calculated using continuous compounding of the percent changes in the 
weekly equity closing prices (equivalent to a buy and hold methodology).  Market-adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the 
market return from the raw return for any given firm.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%  and 1% levels, respectively.     50
Table 7. The Acquisition of Majority Control of the Target Drives Acquirer Returns in Cross-border M&A Transactions.  








































  0.035 *** 
(0.013) 
 
   0.033** 
(0.013) 
 
   0.046*** 
(0.014) 
 
   0.042*** 
(0.015) 
 

















            
Control*Prev 
Relationship 
     0.060* 
(0.033) 
            
 
Diversify 
      -0.001 
(0.013) 
          
 
Target in Asia 
       - 0 . 0 0 4  
(0.013) 
        
 
Acquirer Size 
         2.96e-08 
(1.27e-07) 
       
 
Target Size 
           5.30e-06 
(4.07e-06) 
      
 
Acquirer Cash 
             -9.39e-08 
(1.70e-06) 
    
 
Crisis Period 









Target in FIRE 
                   - 0 . 0 1 5  
(0.015) 
R-squared    0.03  0.04 0.03 0.03  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.06 
N  341 237  198 234 237  210 198  209  237  237 235 198 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of regressions where the dependent variable is abnormal returns for acquirer firms during a 3-week event window (standardized 
to monthly return units) around the announcement date on characteristics of the involved firms.  Mean coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in 
parentheses.  All M&A transactions in the sample involve a public acquirer from a developed market and a public target from an emerging market.  Weekly abnormal 
returns are calculated using a market model and are continuously compounded, then standardized to monthly units.   The acquisition of control is a dummy variable 
identified if the acquirer holds 50% or more of the target firm’s equity following the acquisition and did not previously have control.  Previous relationship is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if the acquirer held equity in the target firm prior to the acquisition.  Diversification is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one 
if the absolute value of the difference in SIC codes between acquirer and target is 1000 or greater.  Acquirer and target size and acquirer cash is measured in US$ million.  
Emerging markets included are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.  Crisis period is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one if the target country is in a currency crisis.  Acquirer and target FIRE dummies take on a value of one if the firm has an SIC code between 6000 
and 6999.   *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   Table 8.  The Acquisition of Majority Control of the Target Does Not Drive Target Returns in Cross-border M&A Transactions.  
 (3a)  (3b)  (3c)  (3d)  (3e)  (3f)  (3g)  (3h)  (3i)  (3j)  (3k)  (3l) 
 
Intercept 


































































            
Control*Prev 
Relationship 
     0.056 
(0.102) 
            
 
Diversify 
       -0.014 
(0.044) 
           
 
Target in Asia 
         -0.034 
(0.042) 
         
 
Acquirer Size 
           7.7e-07** 
(3.8e-07) 
        
 
Target Size 
             3.71e-06 
(1.27-e05) 
      
 
Acquirer Cash 
              -7.5e-08 
(5.2e06) 
   
 
Crisis Period 









Target in FIRE 
                   -0.021 
(0.048) 
R-squared  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.03  0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
N  292  209  175  175  205  209 180  180  180 209  208  206 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of regressions where the dependent variable is market adjusted target returns during a 3-week event window (standardized 
to monthly return units) around the announcement date.   Mean coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.  All M&A transactions in the 
sample involve a public acquirer from a developed market and a public target from an emerging market.  Weekly abnormal returns are calculated using a market 
model and are continuously compounded, then standardized to monthly units.   The acquisition of control is a dummy variable identified if the acquirer holds 50% or 
more of the target firm’s equity following the acquisition and did not previously have control.  Previous relationship is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one 
if the acquirer held equity in the target firm prior to the acquisition.  Diversification is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the absolute value of the 
difference in SIC codes between acquirer and target is 1000 or greater.  Acquirer and target size and acquirer cash is measured in US$ million.  Emerging markets 
included are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.  Crisis period is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of one if the target country is in a currency crisis.  Acquirer and target FIRE dummies take on a value of one if the firm has an SIC code between 6000 and 6999.   *, 
** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.     52
Table 9.  Do Crisis Periods Affect the Creation of Value? 
   
Panel A 
   
Panel B 





















1988 – 1996  -0.039* 
(0.023) 
  -0.014   
(0.015) 
           
1997 – 1999    -0.004 
 (0.019) 
  -0.004 
(0.013) 
         
2000 - 2003      0.034* 
(0.020) 
   0.017 
 (0.014) 
       






















EMBI*  Crisis              -0.278 
(0.245) 
  
EMBI*Control               -0.008 
 (0.0687) 
 
EMBI* Crisis* Control                      0.027 
 (0.163) 
                   
N  341  341 341 237 237  237   263  263  180  180 
R-squared  0.0088  0.0001 0.0086 0.0309 0.0278  0.0334  0.0185  0.0234  0.02421  0.0286 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of regressions where the dependent variable is abnormal returns for acquirer firms during a 3-week event window 
(standardized to monthly return units) around the announcement date.  Mean coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.  The acquisition of 
control is a dummy variable identified if the acquirer holds 50% or more of the target firm’s equity following the acquisition and did not previously have control. Crisis 
period is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the target country is in a currency crisis.  EMBI is the relative value of the JP Morgan Emerging Market’s 
Bond Index (EMBI) spread. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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-0.056 
(0.039) 
     






















Target *  Value 
of Transaction 





NO YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES 
R-squared                
N  1235  1235  843 843 843 843  1235  1235  843  843 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of regressions where the dependent variable is abnormal returns for acquirer firms during a 3-week event window 
(standardized to monthly return units) around the announcement date.  Mean coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.  All M&A 
transactions in the sample involve a public acquirer from a developed market and a public target from an emerging market, or a target in Canada, Europe, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Singapore or the United States.  The acquisition of control is a dummy variable identified if the acquirer holds 50% or more of the target firm’s equity following 
the acquisition and did not previously have control.  Previous relationship is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the acquirer held equity in the target firm 
prior to the acquisition.  Diversification is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the absolute value of the difference in SIC codes between acquirer and 
target is 1000 or greater.  Crisis period is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the target country is in a currency crisis. *, ** , and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   Table 11. Majority Control Matters More in R&D Intensive Industries in Emerging Markets. 
  1 2 3 4 5  6 












Majority Control   0.033**  
(0.013) 


















Rdintensity* Control         0.019*** 
(0.007)  
   -0.001 
(0.005) 








        0.074** 
(0.032) 










            0.044*** 
(0.015) 
         
Firm Fixed Effects Included  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.027 0.028 0.057 0.345 0.346  0.355 
N  237 236 236 838 838  838 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of regressions where the dependent variable is abnormal returns for acquirer firms  
during a 3-week event window (standardized to monthly return units) around the announcement date.  Mean coefficient  
estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.  M&A transactions in the sample for regressions 1-3 involve  
a public acquirer from a developed market and a public target from an emerging market.  Regressions 4-6 extend the  
sample of targets to include developed market targets. The acquisition of control is a dummy variable identified if the  
acquirer holds 50% or more of the target firm’s equity following the acquisition and did not previously have control.  
Rdintensity is a measure that is constructed using all US firms in Compustat from 1990 to 2002.   The research and  
development expense (Compustat data item #46) is divided by net sales (Compustat data item #12) for all firms.  This 
measure is sorted by 2-digit SIC codes, and an average measure of R&D intensity by 2-digit SIC code is constructed.   
   The measure of R&D intensity is then matched by industry with the 2-digit SIC code of the emerging-market targets.   
   *, ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.    